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tAbstract
The article compares the explanatory power of assimilationist and transnational
frameworks with a historically informed generation (historical cohort) thesis that
addresses the long-term cross-border impact of premigration experiences on
immigrant new country adaptation. It tests the utility of the thesis with respect to
immigrant remittance-sending among different waves of Cuban émigrés to the
United States, who had different homeland experiences before uprooting. Regression
analysis is used to assess the relative import of premigration experiences and factors
immigration studies have found to be associated with assimilation and transnationalism.
The article concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the historical cohort
thesis for improved understanding of other immigrant group adaptation and
homeland engagement.
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analysisIntroduction
Since the late 1900s many developing countries have received record levels of remit-
tances, transnational people-to-people income transfers, from their diasporas. In 2012,
remittances to Latin America alone totaled $61 billion (Maldonado and Hayem, 2014).
Many Latin American countries received more hard currency from remittances their
emigrants sent friends and family who had not uprooted than from bilateral and multila-
teral foreign aid. Mounting poverty and limited economic opportunities in the developing
world spearheaded a surge in immigration, on which the growth in remittances rests.
Remittances are a manifestation of immigrant homeland engagement. Yet, immi-
grants differ in their cross-border involvement in ways that existing transnational,
much less assimilation, theories inadequately account for. A historically grounded
framework that takes premigration experiences into account (hereafter referred to as
the historical cohort thesis) will be shown, below, to deepen the understanding of vari-
ability in patterns of remittance-sending, and hence transnational engagement, among
first generation immigrants. According to the thesis, experiences shared in late adoles-
cence and early adulthood, and later-in-life traumatic events, such as economic crises2016 Vang and Eckstein. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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ior, including if they relocate in another country.
In this article we elaborate and test the explanatory power of the historical cohort
thesis to account for differences in remittances sent by Cuban immigrants who
uprooted at different times with different lived experiences. We do so by drawing on a
double birth and migration cohort model that enables us to operationalize premigration
experiences while controlling for potentially confounding duration and period effects.
In the conclusion we discuss the applicability of the historical cohort thesis for improv-
ing the understanding of transnational engagement among other immigrant groups.
Overview of Cuban Émigré Remittance-sending
The Cuban American experience demonstrates that immigrants do not necessarily
share new country earnings with family members in their homeland, even when they
adapt well economically in their new land. Cuban immigrants remit far less than most
Latin American immigrants in the US, despite earning more (Orozco, 2005). In 1990
Cuban Americans remitted a mere $50 million (Orozco, 2005). In contrast, money re-
mitted in the same year to El Salvador —a country whose diaspora in the US is similar
in size to Cuba’s (Motel and Patten, 2012)—totaled $366 million (World Bank, 2015).
By 2012, remittances to both countries increased. Although those sent to El Salvador
remained greater, the differential diminished: $2.6 billion to Cuba (Morales, 2013), $3.6
billion to El Salvador (World Bank, 2015).1 As of the first decade of this century more
than half of all Cuban Americans in Miami, and 41 % nationwide, sent remittances.
They often shared earnings with two or more people in Cuba. Eighty-six per cent of
them sent money at least twice yearly (Bendixen and Associates, 2005: 11–12).
The increase in Cuban American remittances has partly rested on the development
of an institutional milieu in Cuba conducive to immigrant income-sharing (See Duany
2011 for discussion on institutional factors influencing ties between the Spanish
Caribbean, including Cuba, and the US). In 1993 the Cuban government legalized use
of the dollar and expanded opportunities to spend dollars. It also removed barriers to
diaspora visits, which deepened transnational bonding and income-sharing (Eckstein,
2009).2 Meanwhile, Cubans came to covet dollars more as the value of their peso earn-
ings plunged with the economic crisis that ensued when the Soviet Union fell apart and
Soviet aid and trade ground to a precipitous halt, and as the range of goods purchas-
able only in hard currency expanded.
Against this backdrop, US Cuban travel and remittance policy vacillated. In the post-
Cold War it was most restrictive in election years when incumbent presidents running
for reelection appealed to the Cuban American electorate in Florida, the largest “swing”
state (Eckstein, 2009: Chapter Three). Most Cuban American voters emigrated in the
first two decades of Castro’s rule, and most of them favored an embargo of Cuba, in-
cluding at the people-to-people level. Only under President Barak Obama were most
restrictions on Cuban American rights to visit and send remittances to Cuba lifted; as
post-Soviet era émigrés came to account for an ever growing proportion of the Florida
Cuban American community, more were predisposed to homeland engagement.
Fluctuations in US policy notwithstanding, Cuban American remittance-sending
increased after 1990. It increased primarily among post-Soviet era émigrés. For
example, in Miami in 2003 the more recent arrivals were nearly four times as likely
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(Institute for Public Opinion Research/Florida International University, 2004).
Nationwide as well, recent émigrés have been found to be the most likely to send
remittances (Bendixen and Associates, 2005; Bendixen, 2009).
What accounts for the different remittance-sending behavior of first generation
Cuban immigrants who uprooted in different years? In the next section we briefly
summarize three theoretical frameworks relevant for understanding variation in cross-
border economic ties.Theoretical frameworks
Assimilation
For most of the twentieth century both conventional wisdom and sociological theory
focused on immigrant assimilation. Assimilation analyses typically highlighted how the
longer immigrants lived in a new country, the greater their acculturation and overall in-
tegration, owing to their exposure to the ways of their new land (see Alba and Nee
2003 for a review of this perspective). Some scholars refer to this post-migration dy-
namic as the duration effect (Chiswick, 1978; Myers and Lee, 1996).3 Building on the
assimilation paradigm, host country adaptation has also been shown to vary with age at
time of migration: the younger the age, the greater the assimilation and acculturation
(Rumbaut, 2004). Younger immigrants are better able to learn the language of their
adopted country and take advantage of labor market opportunities.
Assimilation focused studies tend to neglect, analytically and empirically, immigrant
homeland engagement and how it may impact on new country assimilation. Implicitly,
if not explicitly, their paradigmatic perspective suggests that homeland ties diminish
the longer immigrants live in their adopted country. Differences in remittance-sending
would, accordingly, be expected to vary inversely with length of new country residence
and associated exposure to assimilation forces, as well as with age at migration. Youn-
ger immigrants would be assumed both to uproot with weaker homeland ties and to in-
tegrate more readily into their new land.Transnationalism
Since the 1990s a new frame of analysis has focused on immigrant transnational
engagement. This conceptual frame highlights how immigrant lives may become
embedded across borders (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992; Massey,
Goldring and Durand, 1994; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999). Contemporary
conditions, such as technological advancements facilitating cross-border travel, com-
munication, and remittance-sending, and new government interest in and facilitation
of diaspora homeland involvement, provide bedrock for the build-up and mainten-
ance of transnational ties (Kivisto, 2001). While transnational analyses have tended
to downplay assimilation forces, Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) have highlighted
the potential simultaneity of assimilation and transnational involvement.
From the vantage point of a transnational perspective, there is no a priori reason to
expect immigrants’ cross-border ties to diminish with the passage of years in their new
country or with acculturation. Rather, transnational ties depend on such factors as im-
migrant earnings, experiences of discrimination in the receiving country, presence of
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associations and other formal as well as informal homeland ties (Levitt, 2001). Indeed,
empirical studies suggest that homeland engagement does not necessarily weaken with
length of new country residence. For example, Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) found age
at migration (whether older or younger than 12 years of age), but not years since emi-
gration, to be associated with cross-border sociocultural engagement and remittance-
sending among Columbian, Salvadoran, and Dominican immigrants they studied. In a
similar vein, Waldinger (2008) and Schans (2010) found that length of residence in a
new country was not a statistically significant predictor of remittance-sending among,
respectively, Hispanics in the US and Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean
origin immigrants in the Netherlands.
Yet, neither the transnational nor the assimilation frame of analysis address, analytic-
ally or empirically, how premigration experiences impact on immigrant adaptation and
transnational engagement. In contrast, the historical cohort thesis does.Premigration historical cohort thesis
Karl Mannheim’s (1952) seminal work on historical generations and Norman Ryder’s
(1965) on cohorts serve as foundation for the historical cohort thesis.4 Mannheim’s
concept of socially constructed generations formed during late adolescence and early
adulthood is pivotal for understanding how premigration experiences shape long-
lasting views on life. During these years individuals are old enough to reflect on their
past and consider alternatives, and, as a result, develop their own distinctive socio-
political consciousness through which they interpret later-in-life experiences. Accord-
ingly, people who grow up in the same place but at different times or at the same time
but in different places with different lived experiences, would be expected to differ in
their perspectives on life.
As enduring as early-in-life experiences are, Ryder argued that traumatic later-in-life
experiences, such as revolutions and economic crises, may lead adults to rethink their
past and modify their outlook on life. His thesis suggests that different birth cohorts
can share similar worldviews if they together experience the same traumatic historical
events. While neither Mannheim nor Ryder focused on immigrants, if early-in-life and
traumatic later-in-life experiences are enduring in their effect, immigrants’ pasts might
continue to influence their behavior after resettling in another country.
Some studies have noted enduring effects of premigration experiences on immigrant
adaptation. Studies of political incorporation, for example, have shown immigrants’ civic
attitudes and engagement to be influenced by political conditions in their homeland, par-
ticularly by how repressive homeland regimes were (Bloemraad, 2006; Bilodeau, 2008).
Yet, these studies provide no analytic framework for understanding how and why premi-
gration experiences shape life after people move to a new country.
The historical cohort thesis, in contrast, anticipates that coming-of-age and trau-
matic later-in-life premigration experiences shape new country adaptation, especially
when immigrants uproot old enough to have well-formed life perspectives of their
own. Premigration experiences would be expected to remain especially consequential
when immigrants with shared experiences resettle in close proximity to, and socialize
with, one another.
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the historical cohort thesis in their qualitative analyses, which showed how Cuban im-
migrants with different premigration experiences adapt differently economically, so-
cially, and politically in the US and relate differently to their homeland. However, to
date the thesis has not been systematically assessed with quantitative data, and in rela-
tion to assimilation and transnational theses that focus on post-migration life.Premigration experiences of different waves of Cuban immigrants
Cuban immigrants experienced ‘different Cubas’ depending on when they were born
and when they emigrated. This was especially true of Cubans who came of age before
the revolution, during Cuba’s radical revolutionary makeover, and amidst the economic
crisis that ensued when Soviet aid and trade ended after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Mannheim’s and Ryder’s frameworks, combined, give reason to anticipate
Cubans with different premigration experiences to take on distinctive views on life.The Pre-revolution formed generation: self-defined exiles
Many Cubans became deeply committed to the revolutionary transformation that Fidel
Castro inspired and oversaw after assuming power in 1959. They accordingly took on
values of the new society for themselves (Eckstein and Krull, 2009). This was particu-
larly true of adolescents and young adults at the time, who were captivated by the new
government’s initial utopian mission to create a more egalitarian and non-materialistic
society. It was true also of many of the previously underprivileged, who perceived
themselves as beneficiaries of the revolution.
Not all Cubans responded positively, however, to the country’s radical makeover.
Wealthy conservative Cubans who came of age before the revolution reacted hostilely
to the socio-political transformation as they lost both their source of livelihood with ex-
propriation of businesses and property and their lifestyle when the government shut-
tered private clubs and private schools (del Toro, 2003). Perceived through pre-
revolution formed lenses, the revolution represented a rejection of all for which they
stood. On the losing side of history, many of them fled the country and settled in the
US, especially in Greater Miami. They soon were joined by medium and small business
owners as their properties, in turn, were nationalized, and by some workers and polit-
ical activists who, though anti-Batista, became disillusioned with Castro’s embracement
of socialism and Marxism-Leninism (Eckstein, 2009: Table 1.1). Despite certain class
and other differences among them, the approximately 600,000 Cubans who moved to
the US between 1959 and 1979 together interpreted their exodus politically. They re-
ferred to themselves as ‘exiles,’ and wanted nothing to do with ‘Castro’s Cuba’ (Eckstein,
2009: 11).
While we are primarily concerned with comparing the entire self-defined exile cohort
with post-Soviet era arrivals, we differentiate between what we call Early and Late Ex-
iles. Early Exiles are those who emigrated between 1959 and 1965. Building on their
premigration-formed social networks, which they reestablished in Miami, and on pre-
migration attained skills and other assets, they adapted well economically (Portes and
Stepick, 1993). They also successfully developed political capital which they used to
convince US policymakers to maintain an embargo of their homeland at both the
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(but mainly between 1965 and 1973, years during which the US and Cuban govern-
ments allowed substantial immigration, in what Washington dubbed Freedom Flights).
Like Early Exiles, they tended to have come of age before the revolution and to have pre-
revolution formed views on life. They accordingly tended to adopt Early Exile’s mentality
for themselves. Many of them would have left earlier had they been able to do so.The 1980s Mariel generation: émigrés with diverse mixes of Pre-revolution and revolution
experiences
In 1980 some 125,000 additional Cubans emigrated from the port of Mariel (after
which few Cubans emigrated for the remainder of the decade) (Masud-Piloto, 1995).
These Cubans experienced the country’s radical makeover, which included a massive
expansion of schooling and healthcare and a dramatic reduction in income inequality,
but also nationalization of most of the economy, forced participation in state linked
workplace and neighborhood associations and in the military, as well as austerity. Com-
pared with Exiles, Mariels were far more working class, darker skinned, and diverse in
age (Eckstein, 2009). Age diversity reflected variation in premigration experiences. Like
Exiles, the oldest Mariels viewed the revolution negatively through pre-revolution
formed lenses. The youngest Mariels, in contrast, only knew firsthand Cuba trans-
formed by revolution. For this reason, Mariels do not represent a pure, ideal-typical
historical cohort filtering Cuba through distinctive lenses of their own. Notwithstanding
age related differences among them, as a group Mariels understood the complexities of
the revolution better than Exiles, and, consequently, were more tolerant of ties with
Cuba and Cubans.New Cubans: post-soviet Era arrivals
The ending of Soviet aid and trade, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, caused an
economic crisis (Mesa-Lago, 2000). The government responded by declaring a Special
Period, a euphemism and legitimation for unprecedented austerity. Food became scarce
and subsistence no longer affordable on previously adequate state earnings.
The crisis left an indelible mark on Cubans’ expectations, values, and social relations,
and caused state influence over people’s lives to diminish (Hernández, 2005). The
trauma was so great that Cubans’ life perspective changed. Although the crisis affected
everyone, and led many of the older generation to abandon their earlier commitment
to the revolution, it left its greatest mark on youth who came of age to interpret life for
themselves in the context of the shattered revolutionary project (Domínguez, 2005:
164). The younger generation took on an outlook very different from their age counter-
parts at the time of the country’s radical makeover. The new generation was more prag-
matic, less politicized, and had more materialistic values. They therefore came to view
the diaspora more favorably than had the ‘children of the revolution’ who, believing in
the revolutionary project, had severed ties with their compatriots who fled the country’s
radical transformation (Eckstein and Krull, 2009). In the context of the crisis Cubans
also came to view individual emigration as part of a family project. Those who left were
expected to share some of their earnings with relatives who remained in Cuba. Young
adults were assumed to be the most employable abroad.
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the Mariel and Exile cohorts in their views about emigration, their homeland, and
cross-border ties. Traumatized by the 1990s economic crisis, they envisioned them-
selves uprooting (much like other Latin American immigrants at the time) mainly for
economic, or political along with economic, reasons (Eckstein, 2009: Appendix). Even
politically disaffected New Cubans tended not to identify with Exiles, who they found
politically intolerant, insensitive to hardships suffered by Cubans who lived through the
revolution, and still committed to how people thought in Cuba before the revolution
(Symmes, 2008). And New Cubans, unlike Exiles, had no desire to sever ties with their
family who remained in Cuba (Eckstein, 2009).
Accordingly, the different waves of Cuban immigrants had different lived experiences
before uprooting that generated different views on life. The remainder of the article as-
sesses how these distinctive premigration experiences impact on Cuban émigré deci-
sions to share income with relatives in Cuba.Data and methods
We draw on cohort analysis to operationalize and evaluate the relative import of premi-
gration experiences. Previous scholars have used a cohort framework to analyze immi-
grant adaptation. For example, Borjas (1985) deployed a cohort approach to estimate the
effects of immigrants’ human capital on their earnings, and Myers and Lee (1996; 1998),
and Myers and Cranford (1998), modeled the effects of aging and length of US residence
on immigrant housing attainment and occupational mobility. However, heretofore no
scholar has conceptualized different immigration cohorts to capture historically grounded
premigration experiences and their possible long-term cross-border impact.5Analytical issues
Two methodological issues arise when examining immigrant adaptation with a cohort
approach. First is the issue of variable identification. Similar to the age-period-cohort
identification problem (Hobcraft, Menken and Preston, 1982), analysis of different im-
migration cohorts raises what is known as a duration-period-cohort identification di-
lemma (Myers and Lee 1996: 54). Since duration (years spent in the host country),
period (year of data observation) and cohort (year of immigration) are linear functions
of one another, including all three variables in a regression model would lead to perfect
collinearity. Yet, it may be theoretically desirable to differentiate and include all three
variables as predictors in a model. The second issue is the confounding of duration and
immigration cohort (Myers and Lee, 1996). Researchers have typically used immigra-
tion cohort to represent effects owing to varying lengths of residence in the host coun-
try (Chiswick, 1978). This is problematic, however, since variation in a response
variable for immigrants arriving in different years can be due to differences in length of
residence, differences in observed and unobserved characteristics between cohorts, or
both. This issue affects our analysis since historical cohorts are defined by year of
immigration.
To address these problems, Myers and Lee (1996) proposed a double cohort method
wherein observations from cross-sectional surveys at two time points are linked
through dual birth and immigration year memberships to create synthetic cohorts that
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shown here (results available upon request), used a hierarchical backward model selec-
tion strategy to obtain the following reduced-form double cohort model:
z ¼ M þ κ þ ηþ π þ κ⋅πð Þ þ η⋅πð Þ ð1Þ
where M = a vector of control variables; κ = survey year; η = birth cohort; π = historicalcohort; (κ⋅π) = temporal duration; and (η⋅π) = age at migration. The model resolves the
identification problem because any period effects that may arise between the different
years of observation are controlled for in the model by κ. Furthermore, we can directly
model the effects of exposure to assimilation forces during the observation period with
(κ⋅π). If time spent in the US decreases immigrants’ propensity to send remittances, we
should observe a negative coefficient on the interaction term. Note, however, that
inclusion of (κ⋅π) achieves partial disentanglement of duration and historical cohort
effects because only temporal duration is directly measured; that is, the impact of
having lived n additional years in the US on top of however many years an immigrant
already spent in the country at the time of first observation.
Since historical cohorts are defined by immigration year, it will not be possible to sta-
tistically isolate and assess the separate contributions of historical cohort and net dur-
ation (total time spent in the US) on remittance-sending (i.e., the two are still
confounded within π). Theory, here, can aid in interpreting whether π represents net
duration effects, historical cohort effects, or both. According to assimilation theory,
time spent in the host country should reduce remittance-sending. If π is merely captur-
ing net duration effects then we would expect to find a stepwise remittance gradient,
with Early Exiles remitting the least because they have been in the US the longest, and
New Cubans remitting the most because they are the most recent arrivals. Late Exiles
and Mariels should be the second and third highest remitting groups, respectively,
given their intermediate arrival years.
Data and conceptualization of variables
Our analysis draws on polls of Cuban Americans 18 years and older conducted in 2000
and 2007 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research and the Cuban Research
Institute of Florida International University (FIU) (Cuban Research Institute, 2015).
The Institute for Public Opinion Research and the Cuban Research Institute has
conducted the only large-scale systematic survey of Cuban Amerians in multiple years.
The institutes interviewed 1,709 Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County in 2000,
and 1,000 Cuban Americans seven years later.6 We restrict our analytical sample to
1,244 Cuba-born respondents who met our historical cohort and age selection criteria
and had no missing information on our dependent and independent variables.
To construct our data, we first differentiated four historical cohorts based on
reported immigration year in the 2000 poll: Early Exiles, 1959–64; Late Exiles, 1965–79;
Mariels, 1980–89; and New Cubans, 1990–98. Next, the historical cohorts were assigned
to five 10-year age groups based on reported age in 2000: 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69,
and 70–79. In the 2007 poll we identified the same historical cohorts but assigned them
to 10-year age groups who were seven years older: 37–46, 47–56, 57–66, 67–76,
and 77–86. We then linked respondents across the two polls through their dual
historical and birth cohort membership. The restricted age range facilitates comparisons
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the first FIU poll all émigrés analyzed would have had at least two years in the US to
secure work and attain earnings which they could remit to family of theirs still in Cuba.
Dependent variable
We assess remittance-sending based on the question, ‘Do you or your relatives in Miami
send money to relatives in Cuba?’ The wording of this question raises some potential
problems of variable misalignment. Misalignment is not an issue when there is a negative
response (i.e., neither respondent nor relatives remit money). An affirmative response,
however, means that either the respondent or relatives, or both, send money. Misalignment
is not present when only the respondent remits or when both the respondent and relatives
remit. Variable misalignment could, however, become an issue when the respondent
answers ‘yes,’ but only the relatives remit money. In such a situation, the predictors
(which are based on respondent’s characteristics) would not correspond with the
outcome (which is based on the relatives’ behavior). Noteworthy, though, family members
often pool money to remit and consider remittances a family, not merely an individual, affair
(Eckstein, 2009: Chapter Six). Consequently, we do not believe that variable misalignment
poses a significant problem for our analysis. Moreover, we compared the proportion of
remittance senders in the 2000 FIU poll with another survey, where Cuban respondents
were asked specifically about their own remitting behavior, and found minimal differences.8
Explanatory variables
Our key explanatory variable of interest is historical cohort. Three assimilation vari-
ables are also tested in our analysis: temporal duration, age at migration, and accultur-
ation. Temporal duration is measured with interaction terms between historical cohort
and survey year (κ⋅π). Age at migration is measured with interaction terms between
birth and historical cohorts (η⋅π). We also include an indicator of acculturation that
has been analyzed in previous studies: language assimilation (Itzigsohn and Saucedo,
2002; Waldinger, 2008).9 Linguistic assimilation is measured with the question, ‘Which
language do you prefer to get your news in?’ Although a direct question on English profi-
ciency would have been preferred, news language preference is the only language related
variable that is repeated in both surveys. Arguably, news language preference is related to
language proficiency since some degree of comprehension is necessary to read or listen to
news in a particular language. The variable is coded into three categories: Spanish-only
(reference), English only, or Bilingual/Other. A preference for getting one’s news in English
(as opposed to Spanish or both English and Spanish) is a proxy for acculturation.
Some scholars have noted that immigrant earnings and the continuous presence of at
least some close family members in the country of origin impact on cross-border ties, espe-
cially remittance-sending (Diaz-Briquets and Perez-Lopez 1997; Itzigsohn and Saucedo,
2002).10 We therefore include in our analysis immigrant household income and relatives in
Cuba as possible predictors associated with the transnational framework. A dummy vari-
able is used to capture the presence of close family in Cuba (0 = no, 1 = yes). We construct
household income as a four category variable: < $20 K (reference), $20-$50 K, $50 K+, and
income missing.
Lastly, age (birth cohort) and period (survey year) are included as control variables. The
reference categories for age group and period are 40–49 (47–56 in 2007) and 2000,
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2 = divorced/other) are additional demographic controls that have been analyzed in
previous studies of transnationalism and thus are included in our models (Schans,
2010; Waldinger, 2008; Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002).11Analytical strategy
We fit five double cohort models to assess the explanatory power of the assimilation,
transnationalism, and historical cohort frameworks. Model 1 establishes baseline differ-
ences in remittance-sending among the historical cohorts, net of period, age, marital
status, and gender. Model 2 includes the transnationalism predictors. Models 3 through
5 tests assimilation predictors associated with acculturation, temporal duration, and
age at migration, respectively.Results
Descriptive findings
Means and standard deviations for the covariates by historical cohort are shown in
Table 1. The historical cohorts differ from one another with respect to age, gender,
news language preference, family-in-homeland, and household income. Early and Late
Exiles are older on average than Mariels and New Cubans. Forty-nine and 52 % of Early
and Late Exiles, respectively, are age 60 or older, compared with 30 % and 21 % of Mar-
iels and New Cubans. There are slightly more female respondents represented among
Late Exiles, whereas gender is more balanced for the other cohorts. Early Exiles include
more high-income earners (37 % have annual household incomes of $50,000 or more).
In contrast, there were fewer proportions of Late Exiles, Mariels, and New Cubans,
who had such high earnings (23, 19 and 13 %, respectively). All cohorts have significant
family ties. Even Early and Late Exiles, who have been in the US for more than 30 years
on average, claim to still have close family in Cuba (54 and 78 %, respectively).
Historical cohorts also exhibit different proclivities to send remittances. Long-term
émigrés tend to remit less than more recent arrivals. At first glance, these unadjusted
proportions suggest that duration may be the underlying cause of the cohort variation
in remittance-sending—that is, the longer émigrés have been in the US, the weaker
their economic ties. But, as demonstrated below, this is not the case. These descriptive
statistics mask complex patterns of remittance-sending among the four historical co-
horts that cannot be fully explained by assimilation forces alone.Multivariate regression findings
Results from multivariate logistic regressions predicting remittance-sending are shown
in Table 2. The coefficients are presented as odds ratios (ORs) for ease of interpret-
ation. The ORs for the historical cohort dummy variables indicate the difference in
remittance-sending for each historical cohort relative to Early Exiles. We are interested
in the full set of historical cohort comparison; hence, the Wald statistic was used to test
the coefficient for each historical cohort against the others in models with main effects
(see Table 3).
Model 1 assesses baseline differences in the odds of remittance-sending for Late Ex-
iles, Mariels, and New Cubans relative to Early Exiles, net of age, period, gender and
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables by Historical Cohorts
Early Late Mariels New
Exiles Exiles Cubans p-value
Sent remittances 27.84 39.86 47.74 72.56 0.000
Birth Cohort:
30-39 (37–46 in 2007) 4.19 11.66 15.41 37.67 0.000
40-49 (47–56 in 2007) 16.77 18.18 21.05 22.79
50-59 (57–66 in 2007) 29.64 17.72 33.46 18.14
60-69 (67–76 in 2007) 26.95 31.00 18.42 14.88
70-79 (77–86 in 2007) 22.46 21.45 11.65 6.51
Survey Year 49.41 52.45 30.07 21.39 0.016
2000 48.80 51.28 46.24 38.14
2007 51.20 48.72 53.76 61.86
Gender 0.007
Male 42.22 34.50 45.49 46.05
Female 57.78 65.50 54.51 53.95
Marital status 0.160
Married 64.97 67.37 61.28 63.72
Single 11.98 10.49 16.92 16.74
Divorced/Other 23.05 22.14 21.80 19.53
Language preference for news
Spanish only 41.92 63.4 78.2 85.58 0.000
English only 22.75 13.52 4.14 2.79
Bilingual/Other 35.33 23.08 17.67 11.63
Have relatives in Cuba 53.29 78.55 81.58 93.02 0.000
Household income : 0.000
<$20 K 23.05 30.07 32.33 33.49
$20 K-$50 k 20.96 27.74 30.45 40.47
$50 K+ 37.43 22.61 18.05 12.56
Income missing 18.56 19.58 19.17 13.49
N 334 429 266 215
FIU Cuba Poll, 2000 and 2007
Unweighted percentages reported. P-values from Pearson chi2 test for equal distribution
Vang and Eckstein Comparative Migration Studies  (2015) 3:6 Page 11 of 20marital status. Late Exiles, Mariels, and New Cubans all have higher odds of
remittance-sending than Early Exiles (OR 1.7, 2.0, and 5.0, respectively; p < 0.001 for
each cohort). This suggests a historical cohort-remittance gradient consistent with an
assimilationist framework. Formal tests contrasting the coefficients for Late Exiles,
Mariels, and New Cubans against one another (see Table 3) show, however, that each
successive cohort does not necessarily remit more than its predecessor. The difference
in the odds of remittance-sending between Late Exiles and Mariels is not statistically
significant (χ2 = 1.2; p-value = 2.7). If assimilation forces are consequential, as the as-
similation thesis predicts, then Late Exiles should remit less than Mariels, given the
former group’s longer stay in the US. Yet the two cohorts have the same odds of remit-
ting money to relatives. The comparison of remittance-sending for New Cubans versus
Late Exiles (χ 2 = 31.9; p < 0.001) and Mariels (χ 2 = 19.5; p < 0.001) indicates exception-
ally high odds of income-sharing for the newest émigrés. Thus, far from a simple
Table 2 Odds Ratios from Double Cohort Logistic Regressions Predicting Remittance-sending
(N = 1,244)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Historical Cohort :
Late Exiles 1.70*** 1.28 1.30 1.39 2.65*
Mariels 2.04*** 1.55* 1.60* 1.81* 2.83*
New Cubans 5.01*** 3.39*** 3.53*** 3.61*** 13.86***
Transnationalism predictors:
Relatives in Cuba 4.44*** 4.50*** 4.55*** 4.68***
Household income
20 k-50 k 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.25
50 k+ 1.28 1.26 1.25 1.36
Income missing 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.83
Assimilation Predictors:
News language preference
English 1.28 1.28 1.50
Bilingual or Other 0.95 0.95 0.99
Temporal Duration (κ⋅π):
Late Exiles 7 years later 0.87 0.83
Mariels 7 years later 0.80 0.77
New Cubans 7 years later 0.95 0.93
Age-at-Migration (η⋅π):
Late Exiles
30-39 (37–36 in 2007) 0.10**
50-59 (57–66 in 2007) 0.63
60-69 (67–76 in 2007) 0.58
70-79 (77–86 in 2007) 0.42
Mariels
30-39 (37–36 in 2007) 0.22
50-59 (57–66 in 2007) 0.98
60-69 (67–76 in 2007) 0.38
70-79 (77–86 in 2007) 0.76
New Cubans
30-39 (37–36 in 2007) 0.08**
50-59 (57–66 in 2007) 0.43
60-69 (67–76 in 2007) 0.17*
70-79 (77–86 in 2007) 0.07**
Constant 0.49*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.07**
Log likelihood −768.50 −723.58 −722.75 −722.55 −710.55
Psuedo R2 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17
FIU Cuba Poll, 2000 and 2007
All models control for survey year (period), birth cohort (age), marital status, and gender
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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suggest that historical cohorts differ in their remitting behavior and in ways not con-
sistent with assimilationist interpretations.
Table 3 Wald Statistics Comparing Remittance-sending for Late Exiles, Mariels, and New Cubans,
Main Effect Double Cohort Regression Models (N = 1,244)
M1 M2 M3
Comparison χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Mariels vs. Late Exiles 1.24 0.266 1.23 0.268 1.47 0.226
New Cubans vs. Late Exiles 31.86 0.000 23.52 0.000 23.46 0.000
New Cubans vs. Mariels 19.47 0.000 13.96 0.000 14.08 0.000
FIU Cuba Poll, 2000 and 2007
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remittances (Model 2) while adjusting for historical cohorts, age, period, gender, and
marital status. Earlier cohorts may remit less than more recent arrivals because they
may no longer have close family members in Cuba. Family-in-homeland is positively as-
sociated with remittance-sending, as scholars of transnationalism posit. Émigrés are
four times more likely to send remittances if they have close family members in Cuba
(OR 4.4; p < 0.001). However, income has no bearing on remittance-sending and, most
notably, does not explain why Early Exiles, with the highest income, currently and in
years past have remitted the least. These results are robust across all the models.
Differences in remittance-sending between Early and Late Exiles are no longer statis-
tically significant once transnationalism variables are included in Model 2, suggesting
that Late Exiles’ greater family ties in Cuba may be the main reason why they remit far
more than Early Exiles. The results indicate that both transnationalism factors and pre-
migration experiences may influence the remitting behavior of Late Exiles. Controlling
for household income and family-in-homeland reduced the odds ratios for remittance-
sending in Models 1 and 2 by 47 % for Mariels and 40 % for New Cubans. Importantly,
however, Mariels and New Cubans continue to differ significantly from Early Exiles and
from one another in their remitting behavior (while differences between Mariels and
Late Exiles are trivial). The fact that Mariels and New Cubans continue to differ from
Early Exiles and from one another in their remitting behavior suggests that there is
something different about these two émigré cohorts that cannot be reduced to mere
differences in sociodemographic composition or transnationalism factors. Whether or
not the cohort differences in remittance-sending are the result of differential exposure
to assimilation forces is explored in the remaining models.
Assimilation forces might weaken commitment to family who remain in immigrants’
homeland. We test the effect of acculturation in Model 3. News language preference,
indicative of acculturation, proves not to be a statistically significant predictor of
remittance-sending. The null finding for acculturation may reflect the fact that Spanish
language retention is very high among all émigré cohorts (Eckstein, 2009: 52). Earlier
arrivals may have a preference for their news in English, but they have not lost com-
mand of their mother tongue and are comfortable with both languages.
In Model 4 we test the impact of temporal duration on income-sharing. An add-
itional seven years of residence in the US did not reduce émigrés’ odds of sending re-
mittances. The null finding for the Exile cohorts may reflect a saturation effect of
duration. In other words, these émigrés have been in the country for well over 30 years
and therefore the influence of time spent in the US on remittance-sending may have
already taken its toll such that an additional seven years would have little effect.
However, even during their early years of US settlement, when transnational bonds
Vang and Eckstein Comparative Migration Studies  (2015) 3:6 Page 14 of 20might be expected to be strong, pre-1990 émigrés resisted cross-border economic ties.
Remittances in 1990, at the eve of the arrival of New Cubans (and prior to the first FIU
survey), were, as previously noted, a mere $50 million.
Duration might be expected to exert its greatest influence on New Cubans, given
their fewer years in the US at the time of the 2000 poll. Yet, our data analysis points to
a non-significant temporal duration effect among them as well. While seven years may
be too short a time interval for assimilation forces to impact their remittance-sending
proclivity, New Cubans had been in the US at least nine years by the time of the 2007
poll. A nine year window ought to pick up duration effects, if consequential.
Age at migration effects are assessed in Model 5. The odds ratios for the historical
cohorts no longer reflect “main effects.” Rather, they are conditional on birth cohort
and reflect inter-historical cohort differences in remittance-sending for 40–49 year olds
(47–56 in 2007). Statistically significant age at migration effects are observed for some
birth cohorts among Late Exiles and New Cubans but not for Mariels. Meanwhile, age
at migration significantly influences the income-sharing behavior of all New Cubans,
except among 50–59 year olds. Yet, the results for New Cubans do not allow us to
draw any firm conclusions about the effects of assimilation since those who uprooted
when younger (30–39 year olds) and also when older (60 years and older) both have
lower odds of remittance-sending than 40–49 year olds.12 Since all New Cubans in our
sample emigrated when 21 or older, it is not clear why 40–49 year olds (who uprooted
between the ages of 30 and 47) have higher odds of remittance-sending than all other
birth cohorts. The significant age at migration effect observed for 30–39 year old Late
Exiles seems to be consistent with an assimilation interpretation since these émigrés
uprooted when younger, on average, than 40–49 year old Late Exiles (30–39 year old
Late Exiles migrated between <1 and 17 years of age whereas 40–49 year old Late
Exiles migrated between 6 to 27 years of age). Yet, because of the overlap in the ages at
migration for these two Late Exile age groups, it is not possible to determine how con-
sequential the age 12 cut-off point is for remittance-sending.Further tests of duration and age at migration
Until this point we relied on the absence of a historical cohort-remittance gradient to
argue that assimilation forces were not responsible for the differences in remittance-
sending observed among the four historical cohorts. Our logic is premised on a negative
linear relationship between time spent in the US (duration) and remittance-sending. How-
ever, as discussed earlier, it is not possible to statistically disentangle net duration effects
from historical cohort effects since both are defined by immigration year. Additionally, we
cannot determine if age at migration influences remittance-sending in ways consistent
with assimilationist predictions.
Thus, we proceed to estimate two supplemental regular (i.e., non-double cohort)
regression models to test the effects of net duration (total time spent in the US) and
age at migration on remittance-sending for each historical cohort separately. Net dur-
ation is defined as the difference between survey year and immigration year. The pres-
ence of a statistically significant negative coefficient on the net duration variable would
indicate evidence of assimilation forces weakening cross-border economic ties. It would
also mean that the historical cohort differences observed in the double cohort
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the result of premigration historically-formed experiences as we hypothesized. We
model age at migration as both a continuous and dichotomous explanatory variable.
The dichotomous variable tests the effect of migration when age 12 or older versus
younger (omitted category) on remittance-sending. Since, in our sample, there are only
a handful of Mariels who migrated when younger than 12, and all of the New Cubans
emigrated at age 21 or older, models with the dichotomous age at migration variable
are estimated for the two Exile cohorts only. Model S1 tests the effects of net duration
and continuous age at migration. Model S2 tests the effects of net duration and dichot-
omous age at migration. Both models control for survey year, gender, marital status,
news language preference, relatives in Cuba, and household income.
The results from this additional analysis are shown in Table 4. We only show the
odds ratios for the net duration and age at migration variables (the effects of the other
covariates are similar to those reported in the double cohort regression models).
Contrary to assimilationist predictions, net duration does not weaken émigrés’ odds of
remitting money to relatives. The null finding for net duration is consistent across all
four historical cohorts. The results confirm that the historical cohort differences
observed in the double cohort regression models do not stem merely from variation in
the length of time spent in the US.
The results for the continuous age at migration variable (Model S1) show statistically
significant effects for New Cubans only. However, the effect is contradictory to
assimilationist predictions. It is true that émigrés who uprooted at older ages are less
likely to send remittances than those who emigrated when younger. However, since all
New Cubans in our sample emigrated as adults, their childhood and adolescence were
spent in Cuba. As such, assimilation forces associated with age at migration, especially
for children younger than 12, are not relevant. Thus, it is likely that the finding forTable 4 Estimated Effects (Odds Ratios) of Duration and Age-at-migration from Logistic Regression
Models Predicting Remittance-sending for Each Historical Cohort Separately
Early Exiles1 Late Exiles2 Mariels3 New Cubans4
Model S1 Model S2 Model S1 Model S2 Model S1 Model S1
Net Duration 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.92
Age at migration
Continuous 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96*
Dichotomousa 0.62 0.55
Constant 0.62 0.32 1.61 1.08 1.87 1.57
Psuedo R2 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.20
N 334 334 429 429 266 215
FIU Cuba Poll, 2000 and 2007
*p < .05 All models control for survey year (period), gender, marital status, news language preference, relatives in Cuba,
and household income. Model S2, with dummy variable for migration at age 12 or older, was not estimated for Mariels
and New Cubans because of too few and zero cases of émigrés who uprooted when younger than 12, respectively
1Early Exiles had been in the US on average for 42.4 years (SD: 3.7). The ages at migration ranged between less than1
and 42 years with a mean migration age of 20.4 years (SD: 11.1)
2Late Exiles had been in the US on average for 33.5 years (SD: 5.1). The ages at migration ranged between less than 1
and 54 years with a mean migration age of 27.9 years (SD: 12.8)
3Mariels had been in the US on average for 21.6 years (SD: 4.6). The ages at migration ranged between 10 and 66 years
with a mean migration age of 35.6 (SD: 12.33)
4New Cubans had been in the US on average for 10 years (SD: 4.2). The ages at migration ranged between 21 and
74 years with a mean migration age of 41.6 (SD: 12.5)
aAge 12 and older versus younger than 12 (reference category)
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for Model S2 indicate that 12 is not an important age at migration cut-off point for
Early and Late Exiles’ cross-border economic ties. There are trivial differences in
remittance-sending among Late and Early Exiles who migrated when younger and older
than 12. These results provide further evidence that differences in exposure to
assimilation forces are not at the root of the variation in Cuban émigrés remittance-
sending.
Conclusions
The article tested a premigration, historically-informed cohort thesis to deepen the un-
derstanding of immigrant adaptation. Although earlier work (Eckstein and Barberia,
2002) deployed a historical cohort framework to investigate Cuban American adapta-
tion in the US, it did not systematically assess the competing and/or complementary
effects of assimilation and transnationalism forces. We make an important contribution
to the immigration literature by demonstrating how premigration experiences, em-
bodied in historical cohorts, combine with new country settlement and transnational
factors, to influence cross-border economic ties—and, by implication, possibly other
aspects of transnational engagement.
Our analysis showed post-Soviet era émigrés to be the most transnationally engaged,
and émigrés who fled the revolution soon after Castro assumed power in 1959 the least
so. These émigré cohorts had very different lived experiences before uprooting, which
shaped their life-perspectives and how they relate, as a result, to their homeland from
their new land. The first émigré cohort came of age before the revolution, and viewed
their country’s radical makeover through pre- and politicized, anti-revolution lenses.
Perceiving themselves as exiles, they support an embargo of Cuba, including at the
people-to-people level. In contrast, the post-Soviet era cohort’s views on life were
shaped by the crisis that ensued when the Soviet Union broke apart and Soviet aid and
trade abruptly ended—a crisis that shattered belief in the revolutionary project. Mainly
envisioning themselves as economic immigrants, they wish to maintain ties with and
help family they left behind.
We examined possible explanations of variability in immigrant adaptation, linked to
the assimilation framework, namely, length of time in the US, age at migration, and
acculturation, and found neither temporal nor net duration to have significant effects
on the remitting behavior of Cuban émigrés. Age at migration was predictive of immi-
grants’ propensity to remit, but only for some age-groups among Late Exiles and New
Cubans. Furthermore, the presumed age-12 threshold was not supported by the empir-
ical analysis. Acculturation, as measured by news language preference, also proved
inconsequential to émigré remittance-sending. Together, the results indicate that the
assimilation paradigm by itself is insufficient to explain the variation in cross-border
economic ties observed among different waves of first generation Cuban immigrants in
Miami.
We also explored the explanatory power of two factors transnational analysts claim
affect remittance-sending: household income and family-in-homeland. The presence of
close family members in Cuba, but not income, was shown to be associated with higher
odds of remittance-sending. While family-in-homeland was one of the strongest predic-
tors of cross-border economic ties, inclusion of this variable in our models did not
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grés. This is because family-in-homeland is necessary, but not sufficient, to induce
remittance-sending. Premigration historically-formed perspectives shape immigrants’
proclivity to share earnings with family in their home country, independently of their
income. The historical cohort thesis thereby builds on, but deepens, the understanding
of dynamics the transnational paradigm addresses.
Our analysis, nonetheless, leaves a few issues unaddressed that, hopefully, future
research will elucidate. For one, might historical cohort differences in remittance-
sending be institutionally explained by different transnational barriers in effect when
immigrants uproot that shape remittance-sending habits in the long-run, even after
barriers are lifted? Our research suggests, but does not prove, that historical cohort
experiences influence cross-border economic ties even when institutional conditions
become more conducive to cross-border income sharing. Two, validation of the his-
torical cohort thesis ultimately rests on more detailed data that enables statistical
separation of historical cohort and net duration effects. Hopefully, our analysis will
inspire other studies, including of other immigrant groups. Evidence from studies of
Dominican and Salvadoran immigrants do suggest that premigration experiences
shape new country adaptation and transnational engagement. Only after experien-
cing homeland economic crises did a significant number of immigrants from these
countries send remittances (Menjivar, 2000: 100; Landolt, Autler and Baires, 1999;
Itzigsohn, Cabral, Medina and Vázquez, 1999). There also is evidence that diverse
waves of immigrants from other countries experiencing social revolutions, namely
Vietnam (Shelley, 2001), China (Kuhn, 2008; Pieke, Nyiri, Thuno and Ceccagno,
2004), and Poland (Erdmans 1998), relate differently to their homeland from their
new land, with differences traceable to distinctive premigration experiences.
In sum, the differences among Cubans who uprooted at different times with different
premigration experiences reveal that extant studies, which focus on contrasts between
first and second generation immigrants, homogenize and ignore important differences
in adaptation and transnational engagement among foreign-born. Our analysis calls for
“new thinking,” including for a new conceptual frame, to improve both our descriptive
and theoretical understanding of immigrant experiences. It points to enduring cross-
border influences of immigrants’ pasts that both assimilation and transnational ana-
lyses, to date, have left undocumented and unexplained. The “new thinking” also calls
for compilation of new data, in order to assess, better, how premigration experiences
influence immigrant lives.Endnotes
1For data on remittances to Latin America see Inter-American 2007, p. 7 and the
World Bank (2015). See Eckstein 2009, pp. 178 and 179, and references therein, for a
discussion of remittance estimates specifically for Cuba.
2This article is based on the situation that transpired before Raúl Castro announced
in September 2010 that 500,000 Cubans would be released from their state sector jobs
and permitted to pursue private employment, which might induce Cuban Americans
to send more remittances and even invest in small Cuban family businesses (albeit in
violation of the US embargo).
Vang and Eckstein Comparative Migration Studies  (2015) 3:6 Page 18 of 203Portes, in collaboration with others (e.g., Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut,
1996) also addressed how the nature of assimilation varies with the groups with whom
immigrants associate, connoted as “segmented assimilation.”
4See Eckstein (2009), Chapter One for overview of Mannheim and Ryder theses.
5The kinds of immigration cohort analyses carried out by Borjas (1985), Myers and
Lee (1996), Myers and Cranford (1998), as well as in this article, are distinct from
studies of immigrant generations based on genealogical remove from the first in a
family to emigrate. Generational cohort analyses based on genealogical remove are
conceptually ahistoric.
6The 2000 but not 2007 poll included interviews with non-Cuban Americans in
Miami-Dade County, as well as with Cuban Americans nationally. We focus exclu-
sively on Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade, for which data are available for both
years.
7The youngest birth cohort was dropped from the first observation period while the
oldest birth cohort was dropped from the latest observation period (See Myers and
Lee, 1998, p. 603 for further details on rationale behind sample selection for the
double cohort design). We cut off the youngest age group at 30 because there were
no Early Exiles younger than age 30 in the 2000 poll.
8A 2005 survey of first generation Cuban Americans age 18 and older in Florida by
Bendixen and Associates found 39 % to have sent remittances, whereas 31 % of similarly
aged émigrés in the FIU 2000 survey reported sending remittances. One might expect to
see significantly higher proportions of remittance-senders in the FIU 2000 survey
compared with the Bendixen and Associates survey if ‘yes’ responses to the FIU remit-
tance question were being inflated by respondents reporting the remitting behavior of
their relatives but not their own practices. The small difference in the proportion of
remittance-senders in the two surveys suggests that variable misalignment is not a serious
issue in our analysis.
9Citizenship is another indicator of acculturation. However, it is highly correlated
with historical cohorts and therefore was not included as a covariate. Ninety-six per
cent of Early Exiles and 91 % of Late Exiles are US citizens. The proportions of
naturalized citizens among Mariels and New Cubans are 65 and 33 %, respectively.
10We exclude other characteristics cited in the literature as predictive of homeland
engagement, namely motivation for emigration, frequency of homeland visits, and
participation in ethnic organizations. The FIU survey did not query respondents about
migration motivations. Respondents were asked about homeland visits, but because
information on when visits took place was not queried we could not analyze trans-
national social engagement. Information about ethnic organization participation is not
repeated in the two surveys.
11In preliminary analysis, we also explored the effects of education and political
party affiliation on remittance-sending. However, because education was highly
correlated with household income (r = 0.42), and not a statistically significant pre-
dictor of remittance-sending, we dropped it from the final analysis. Political party
affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent) was also not a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of remittance-sending because there is not enough variation in this
variable. Most respondents, even among New Cubans, reported Republican as their
party affiliation.
Vang and Eckstein Comparative Migration Studies  (2015) 3:6 Page 19 of 2012In additional exploratory analyses, we looked at the distribution of émigrés who re-
ported still having close family in Cuba by age group for each historical cohort. We found
that there were no statistically significant age-group differences in the proportion of émi-
grés who still had close family in Cuba among Early Exiles, (χ2 = 1.1187, p-value = 0.891),
Late Exiles (χ2 = 5.6054, p-value = 0.231), Mariels (χ2 = 1.9209, p-value = 0.750), or New
Cubans (χ2 = 2.7923, p-value = 0.593). Thus, age differences in remittance-sending are not
linked to to age-group variations in having close relatives in Cuba.
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